Abstract This paper is concerned with a natural deduction system for First Degree Entailment (FDE). First, we exhibit a brief history of FDE and of combined systems whose underlying idea is used in developing the natural deduction system. Then, after presenting the language and a semantics of FDE, we develop a natural deduction system for FDE. We then prove soundness and completeness of the system with respect to the semantics. The system neatly represents the four-valued semantics for FDE.
a formula exactly one truth value. For Dunn, however, evaluations are relations between a truth value and a formula. A formula may then take (relate to) no truth value or may take (relate to) multiple truth values. 4 One feature of Dunn's semantics for FDE that we should take notice of is that truth and falsity are not mutually complementary. Truth and falsity are considered separately and are independent notions in Dunn's semantics. This feature plays an important role in developing a natural deduction system for FDE later in this paper.
Combined systems
The idea of considering true and false formulas separately can also be found in the study of formal logics for 'assertion' and 'rejection'. Łukasiewicz was, to the best of our knowledge, the first to introduce both a sign for 'assertion' and a sign for 'rejection' into formal logic. Tracing back the history of the philosophy of logic, Łukasiewicz followed Brentano (1838 Brentano ( -1917 , who propounded a nonpropositional theory of judgment. Brentano [4] argued that As every judgement is based on an idea, the statement expressing a judgement necessarily contains a name [of the idea]. To this, another sign must come, a sign corresponding to the inner state which we call judging, that is, a sign completing the bare name to a sentence. And because this judging can be twofold, viz., asserting or rejecting, the sign indicating it must be twofold too, one for affirmation and one for denial. These signs themselves do not mean anything, but in conjunction with a name, they are the expression of a judgement. Therefore, the most general scheme of a statement is ' A is' and ' A is not'. 5 In the 1921 paper "Logika dwuwartościowa," later translated as "Two-valued logic," Łukasiewicz followed Brentano in adding to Frege's idea of assertion Brentano's idea of rejection. In his early works, Łukasiewicz argued that a proposition must be rejected if and only if it is false, parallel with Frege's condition for the assertion of a proposition. 6 This system is first described in Łukasiewicz [8] , 7 where Łukasiewicz also propounded a system of rejection for Aristotle's syllogistics, after some technical problems had been solved by Słupecki. Łukasiewicz also tried to construe systems of rejection for the intuitionistic propositional logic (IPL) and for his own version of modal logic. All these systems share one characteristic: they are all "combined systems," that is, they all include both a sign for 'assertion' and a sign for 'rejection'. One of the advantages of combined systems over traditional ones worth mentioning in this paper is that metatheoretical results can be incorporated in the object language of the system under consideration. For instance, the disjunction property of IPL can be formulated in the object language of a proof system as follows:
Now, since in many of the combined systems, in particular the systems of Łukasiewicz, ϕ is complemented by the failure of ϕ, 8 the concept of rejection contained in the systems is classical. Nonetheless, combined systems, prima facie, take the idea seriously that (possibly) false formulas be considered separately from true formulas. The idea of Dunn's semantics seems to have another home here. 
Language and semantics
Definition 2.3 Let M = F , ν be an interpretation for the language where ν is an evaluation such that ν M is a function from A to ℘({0, 1}). Then ν M is extended to an evaluation for all formulas ϕ and ψ by the following conditions:
Definition 2.4 Let ⊆ F and M be an interpretation. Then
We are now in a position to define validity. Validity defined below incorporates the concept of Dunn's semantics for FDE. It concerns not only truth but also falsity as in Dunn's semantics. 9
Definition 2.5 (FDE Validity) Let , ⊆ F and ϕ ∈ F . Then
3 A natural deduction system While providing a Hilbert-style system and a Gentzen-style system and natural deduction systems for other relevant logics, Anderson and Belnap do not give any natural deduction systems for FDE. The first natural deduction system for FDE to be formally introduced, other than the system developed in this paper, will be by Priest [9] . 10 In this section, we introduce a natural deduction system for FDE, NDFDE. The system is developed by amalgamating the concept of Dunn's semantics and that of the combined systems. Instead of taking ϕ to be an assertion of ϕ (a usual policy in combined systems), here it is semantically interpreted as: ϕ takes 'truth' as a truth value. Similarly, ϕ is interpreted as: ϕ takes 'falsity' as a truth value.
The system NDFDE is defined as follows. 11
Definition 3.1 Derivations in the system NDFDE are inductively generated as follows.
Basis:
The proof tree with a single occurrence of an assumption ϕ or ϕ is a derivation.
Induction
Step: Let D, D 1 , D 2 , D 3 be derivations. Then they can be extended by the following rules:
where [ ϕ] and [ ϕ] are assumptions which are discharged by the application of the rules.
Lemma 3.2 De Morgan rules of the following forms are available in NDFDE (double lines indicate that the rules work both ways):
; → 2; ϕ ⇐⇒ There is a derivation of ϕ from ∪ in NDFDE. 
Soundness
The other cases can be proved analogously.
Theorem 4.2 (Soundness of NDFDE)
Proof: The proof is by induction on the depth of derivation. All that needs to be checked is that the rules preserve truth and falsity in the appropriate way. This can be shown using Lemma 4.1.
Completeness
We now prove the completeness theorem for NDFDE. Priest [9] demonstrates techniques to prove completeness theorems for natural deduction systems for various relevant and paraconsistent logics. 12 Although Priest defines validity and derivability in a standard way, his techniques provide some insights into the structure of the proof for the theorem. Here we adapt his techniques in our proof. 
; → 2; ϕ =⇒ ϕ ∈ .
Definition 5.2 Let
; be a theory. Then ; is dual prime, if ; has both the disjunction property and the conjunction property, that is, if both
Lemma 5.3 Let , ⊆ F and ϕ, ψ ∈ F . Let ; be a dual prime theory. Then
Proof:
(i) Suppose ϕ∧ψ∈ . Then ; → ϕ∧ψ; 2. So ; → ϕ; 2 and ; → ψ; 2 by ∧E . Since ; is a theory, ϕ ∈ and ψ ∈ . Suppose ϕ ∈ and ψ ∈ . By ∧I , ; → ϕ∧ψ; 2. Since ; is a theory, ϕ∧ψ ∈ . (ii) Suppose ϕ∧ψ ∈ . By dual primeness, ϕ ∈ or ψ ∈ . Suppose ϕ ∈ or ψ ∈ .
By ∧I , ; → 2; ϕ∧ψ. Since ; is a theory, ϕ∧ψ ∈ . (iii) Suppose ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ . By dual primeness, ϕ ∈ or ψ ∈ . Suppose ϕ ∈ or ψ ∈ . By ∨I , ; → ϕ∨ψ; 2. Since ; is a theory, ϕ∨ψ ∈ . (iv) Suppose ϕ∨ψ ∈ . By ∨E , ; → 2; ϕ and ; → 2; ψ. Since ; is a theory, ϕ ∈ and ψ ∈ . Suppose ϕ ∈ and ψ ∈ . By ∨I , ; → 2; ϕ∨ψ. Since ; is a theory, ϕ∨ψ ∈ . (v) Suppose ϕ ∈ . By ¬I , ; → 2; ¬ϕ. Since ; is a theory, ¬ϕ ∈ . Suppose ¬ϕ ∈ . By ¬E , ; → ϕ; 2. Since ; is a theory, ϕ ∈ . (vi) Suppose ¬ϕ∈ . By ¬E , ; → 2; ϕ. Since ; is a theory, ϕ∈ . Suppose ϕ ∈ . By ¬I , ; → ¬ϕ; 2. Since ; is a theory, ¬ϕ ∈ . 
We define the following by means of the sequence defined above thus: * ; * ; * := n∈ω n ; n∈ω n ; n∈ω n .
(i) We show that * ; * → * ; 2 by induction on the construction of * ; * ; * .
Basis: n = 0. Then 0 ; 0 → 0 ; 2 by assumption. Induction Hypothesis: n ; n → n ; 2.
Induction
Step: We must show that n+1 ; n+1 → n+1 ; 2. There are two cases: (a) n +1 = m +1 for some m ∈ {0, 2, 4, . . .}, and (b) n +1 = m +2 for some m ∈ {0, 2, 4, . . .}.
(a) Suppose that n + 1 = m + 1 for some m ∈ {0, 2, 4, . . .}. Proof: Assume that ; → 2; for , , ⊆ F . Let χ 0 , χ 2 , χ 4 , . . . be an enumeration of F . Let m ∈ {0, 2, 4, . . .}. We define by recursion the sequence n ; n ; n (n ∈ ω) as follows: Proof: Suppose that ; → ϕ; 2 for , ⊆F and ϕ∈F . By applying Lemma 5.5 with {ϕ} as , there is a dual prime theory * ; * for * ⊇ and * ⊇ and * ⊇ , such that * ; * → * ; 2.
Let M (= F , ν ) be an interpretation and p ∈ A. We define an evaluation ν as:
It is then asserted that the above conditions extend to all formulas:
The assertion is proved by structural induction on ϕ.
Basis: By assumption:
Induction Hypothesis: For all ψ with fewer logical operators than ϕ:
Step: There are six cases based on the connectives in ϕ.
by Definition 2.3 ⇐⇒ ψ 1 ∈ * and ψ 2 ∈ * by Induction Hypothesis ⇐⇒ ψ 1 ∧ψ 2 ∈ * by Lemma 5.3.
by Induction Hypothesis ⇐⇒ ψ 1 ∧ψ 2 ∈ * by Lemma 5.3.
Similarly, we have
Hence the evaluation conditions defined above hold for all formulas by induction. Since * ; * → * ; 2, we have that ϕ ∈ * . By the above conditions then, 1 ∈ ν M (ϕ). But 1∈ ν M (ψ) and 0 ∈ ν M (χ) for all ψ ∈ * and χ ∈ * . Hence * ; * |= ϕ; 2. Let M (= F , ν ) be an interpretation and p ∈ A. We define an evaluation ν as:
This assertion is proved as in Lemma 5.7. Since * ; * → 2; * , we have that ϕ ∈ * . By the above conditions, then, 0 ∈ ν M (ϕ). But 1∈ ν M (ψ) and 0 ∈ ν M (χ) for all ψ ∈ * and χ ∈ * . Hence * ; * |= 2; ϕ. 
Moreover, if we add the De Morgan rules as primitive, there will be some rules of inference which are redundant. For example, ¬∧ E u,v in the new system will be a special case of ∨E u,v . The resulting system will then be that of Priest [9] , as can easily be checked. 13 These changes give rise to changes to the definitions of validity and derivability as well. Since every (rejected) formula in in our definition of validity, that is, Definition 2.5, can be incorporated into by placing '¬' in front of the formulas under consideration, validity is defined standardly. Similarly, derivability is defined standardly. Then soundness and completeness can be established as in [9] .
The fact that NDFDE collapses under the proposed substitution to a standard system, such as Priest's, however, does not imply the inferiority of the system presented in this paper, as there are some obvious advantages of our combined system over the standard ones. First, NDFDE visually reflects the underlying idea of Dunn's semantics: truth and falsity are evaluated separately. Second, because of the introduction of both asserted and rejected formulas in our proof system, our system, contrary to Priest's, does not have any rules for combinations of logical operators: each operator has two introduction rules and two elimination rules, according to the status (asserted or rejected) of the formula which serves as a premise in the application of a rule. Rules which necessitate combinations of operators obscure the meanings of the operators. In constructing a proof tree in our system, at each step only the principal operator needs to be considered. This procedure makes the construction of proofs intuitive and mechanical, which is the main purpose of formal logics.
Third, NDFDE has conjunction elimination rules which have the same forms as disjunction elimination rules. Standardly, the disjunction elimination rule includes subproof trees, while the conjunction elimination rule does not. So they have different forms. In NDFDE, the conjunction elimination rule, ∧E , has the same form as the disjunction elimination rule, ∨E , and ∧E does the same as ∨E . Thus the elimination rules for conjunction and disjunction are dual. This feature of the system, therefore, provides symmetric proofs which capture the semantics in a natural way without any technical complications.
Finally, our definition of validity may be extended to capture more general consequence relations as follows. Proof-theoretical characterizations of the above consequence relations have yet to be investigated. However, it does not seem impossible to give a proof theory in the style of Konikowska [6] . Moreover, these general consequence relations may be studied in the context of many logics other than FDE as well. 7 . For a synopsis of the history of theories of rejection for CPL, the reader may have recourse to Tamminga [13] .
8. For a discussion of this feature of combined systems, see [13] .
9. Standardly, validity for FDE is defined as in classical logic as follows:
|= ϕ ⇐⇒ For all M : if 1∈ ν M ( ), then 1 ∈ ν M (ϕ).
10. After the development of Dunn's semantics, the history of FDE is largely anecdotal. For this reason, it is uncertain whether the system provided by Priest will be the first. However, there do not seem to be any published papers that introduce natural deduction systems for FDE. This claim was suggested in conversations with Dunn and Priest.
11. The notational conventions used here are a slight modification of those of Troelstra and Schwichtenberg [15] .
12.
A completeness proof for a classical natural deduction system can be found in Tennant [14] .
13. Smullyan [12] shows a similar result for a classical tableaux system.
